Mechanisms, Models and Laws in Understanding Supernovae by Illari, P
Vol.:(0123456789)




Mechanisms, Models and Laws in Understanding Supernovae
Phyllis Illari1 
 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
There has been a burst of work in the last couple of decades on mechanistic explanation, 
as an alternative to the traditional covering-law model of scientific explanation. That work 
makes some interesting claims about mechanistic explanations rendering phenomena 
‘intelligible’, but does not develop this idea in great depth. There has also been a growth of 
interest in giving an account of scientific understanding, as a complement to an account of 
explanation, specifically addressing a three-place relationship between explanation, world, 
and the scientific community. The aim of this paper is to use the contextual theory of sci-
entific understanding to build an account of understanding phenomena using mechanistic 
explanations. This account will be developed and illustrated by examining the mechanisms 
of supernovae, which will allow synthesis of treatment of the life sciences and social sci-
ences on the one hand, where many accounts of mechanisms were originally developed, 
and treatment of physics on the other hand, where the contextual theory drew its original 
inspiration.
Keywords Understanding · Mechanisms · Mechanistic explanation · The contextual theory 
of scientific understanding · Intelligibility · Supernovae · SN1987A
1  Introduction: What is the Question?
There are two important areas of debate in philosophy of science which both concern intel-
ligible explanations, but are not yet connected. First, various authors in the mechanisms lit-
erature claim that good mechanistic explanations are ‘intelligible’, although they do not say 
much about what this means. Accounts of mechanistic explanation have been developed 
over the last two decades in a literature that provided an alternative to covering law expla-
nation, and primarily studied cases from the life sciences. Secondly, over the last decade 
there has been an emergence of interest in characterising scientific understanding, where 
that is explicitly conceived of as an attempt to elucidate a three-place relation between 
world, explanation, and the scientific community (see papers in de Regt et  al. 2009 and 
de Regt 2017). Mieke Boon summarises the view the three-place approach is reacting to:
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[M]ost authors reject it [sc. understanding] as a notion of philosophical interest 
because they assume that it is a mere psychological surplus of explaining. [...] The 
tradition in which Trout rejects the importance of scientific understanding presup-
poses that a philosophical account of science can be explicated in terms of a two-
placed relation between world and knowledge. (Boon 2009, 250)
The idea is that previous treatment of understanding has largely either considered it to be 
little more than possession of, beliefs about, or perhaps communication of, an explana-
tion,1 or considered it to be a purely subjective and not very important phenomenological 
state—leaving no space for any substantive and scientifically important account of under-
standing.2 The views I will examine reject this. Specifically, in one of the first papers in this 
tradition, ‘A contextual approach to scientific understanding’, de  Regt and Dieks (2005) 
claim that intelligibility is a value that scientists in a particular community at a particular 
time confer on theories they can use. De Regt and Dieks draw paradigm cases from phys-
ics, but philosophers such as Leonelli (2009), who is also approaching understanding in 
broadly this way, draws ideas from the life sciences.
In this paper, I will apply the contextual theory to the understanding of phenomena 
gained from mechanistic explanations. This account will be developed by discussing 
our mechanistic understanding of the phenomenon of supernovae, specifically following 
SN1987A, spotted in 1987 and still one of the most important supernovae ever studied. 
Consider the following claim from Nature at the end of 1987:
The neutrinos detected from the recent supernova 1987A (SN1987A) in the Large 
Magellanic Cloud by two large water Cerenkov detectors run by collaborations at 
Kamiokande and at IMB confirm dramatically our understanding of the generic 
mechanism of formation of type II supernovae: the gravitational collapse of a mas-
sive stellar core to form a neutron star or black hole. (Walker 1987, 609)
Illari and Williamson (2012) have already argued that the mechanisms of supernovae fit the 
core three-part account of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation that is becoming con-
sensus in the mechanisms literature: “A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities 
and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon” (Illari 
and Williamson 2012, 120). Illari and Williamson explain how this consensus account cap-
tures work of many major mechanists, and so I will use this account to build an account 
of understanding phenomena mechanistically. This will allow me to address the enormous 
variety of things that are done in explaining supernovae mechanistically, and to tease out 
two things in this story: first, the place of entities and activities, and, second, the inter-
dependent nature of our understanding of mechanisms, models, and more basic physical 
theory.3
1 For recent work that takes this kind of approach, see Strevens (2009) and Potochnik (2011). For extended 
defence of this view, see Khalifa (2012, 2015), and for criticism see Newman (2014). Khalifa thinks the 
skill condition in de Regt’s work is either unnecessary or trivial. It will become clear that I hold it to be 
both necessary and substantive, as I argue for this extensively, thoroughly agreeing with Newman (2014) 
that scientific understanding requires a significant amount of non-propositional knowledge not captured by 
logical relations.
2 In current work, most notably Trout (2002).
3 I will not address how scientific knowledge is held in society, nor will I treat intelligibility historically 
(for an excellent book see Dear 2006). Note finally that I am not directly addressing the ontic-epistemic 
debate concerning mechanistic explanation (see Illari 2013), but providing an account of understanding 
phenomena mechanistically that I think could in principle be used by both sides of the ontic-epistemic 
divide.
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I will begin, in Sect.  2, by bringing the claims of mechanists together with the con-
textual theory of scientific understanding to build a theoretical account of understanding 
phenomena using mechanistic explanations, and setting up some interesting questions that 
arise about virtues of mechanistic explanations. In Sect. 3, I will develop this account by 
applying it to understanding the mechanisms of supernovae. It will turn out that the mecha-
nisms of supernovae are particularly interesting for this purpose, as they enable a creative 
synthesis between the use of enormously general theories, and the use of multiple models, 
even down to multiple models of a particular supernova: SN1987A. As a teaser, consider 
the following from an astrophysics textbook:
Astrophysics does not deal with a special, distinct class of effects and processes, 
as do the basic fields of physics. [...] astrophysics deals with complex phenomena, 
which involve processes of many different kinds. It has to lean, therefore, on all the 
branches of physics, and this makes for its special beauty. The theory of the struc-
ture and evolution of stars presents a unique opportunity to bring separate, seemingly 
unconnected physical theories under one roof. (Prialnik 2010, 28–29)
Section  3 will show that understanding mechanistic explanations of type II supernovae 
requires modelling activities, entities and their organization in a way that requires distinc-
tively mechanistic modes of virtues. It further requires a surrounding architecture of at least 
theories and laws, models and simulations: in this case at least our understanding of theory 
and mechanisms are interdependent. I will finish by drawing some wider conclusions, in 
Sect. 4, reflecting on what this means for the contextual theory of scientific understanding.
2  Understanding Phenomena
In this section I will apply the contextual theory of scientific understanding to develop 
an account of understanding mechanistic explanations of phenomena, before going on in 
Sect. 3 to apply the account to SN1987A.
2.1  Intelligible Mechanisms
The new mechanist literature arose alongside the realisation that traditional philosophy of 
science, focusing primarily on laws and theories, had limited application to the life sci-
ences, which study a domain that is considerably more local and diverse than some areas 
of physics. Although the biggest burst of work was only initiated by Machamer, Darden 
and Craver’s famous paper (Machamer et  al. 2000, now commonly known as “MDC”), 
the mechanisms literature has become very influential. While there has been a great deal 
of progress on what a mechanistic explanation is, there has been little on what it means to 
understand a mechanism, or to understand a phenomenon mechanistically.4
In addressing the question of understanding or intelligibility, I hope to show here a 
different mode for the development of many of the ideas concerning representation and 
communication of mechanistic explanations currently of interest. Ideas bearing on under-
standing actually arose early in the mechanisms literature. MDC write: “Descriptions of 
4 Work sometimes bears on this obliquely, such as the debate about whether mechanisms are ontic (the 
mechanism itself explains; Craver 2014), or epistemic (some form of description of the mechanism 
explains; Wright and Bechtel 2007; Wright 2012). In Illari (2013) I have attempted to argue that this disa-
greement is not so deep as it appears.
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mechanisms render the end stage intelligible by showing how it is produced by bottom 
out entities and activities” (Machamer et al. 2000, 21). For MDC, what they call “bottom 
out” activities and entities are those which are regarded as unproblematic by a scientific 
field at a particular time. They say that in molecular biology bottom-out activities are gen-
erally those of macromolecules, smaller molecules, and ions. These activities are usually 
geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, energetic, or electro-magnetic (Machamer et al. 
2000, 14). Scientists in the field see no need to explain these activities further, although of 
course they may be targets of explanations in other fields. We will see that the bottom-out 
entities and activities of supernovae vary widely.
Although intelligibility is not their primary concern, MDC mention it often (pp. 3, 12, 
21–23). It is fairly clear that they take mechanistic explanations to be intelligible in a way 
in which explanations subsuming the phenomenon under a covering law are not. The idea 
is that unlike laws, mechanisms explain how the phenomenon is produced, by identifying 
the entities and their activities that are responsible for the phenomenon, often laying out 
stages in that production. They write: “Productive continuities are what make the connec-
tions between stages intelligible” (Machamer et al. 2000, 3). It is important to MDC that 
these connections be uninterrupted: “In a complete description of mechanism, there are no 
gaps that leave specific steps unintelligible; the process as a whole is rendered intelligible 
in terms of entities and activities that are acceptable to a field at a time” (Machamer et al. 
2000, 12). So bottom out entities and activities are regarded as the stopping place for mech-
anistic explanations generated by that field at that time, since they are regarded as needing 
no further explanation, although this can change over time, and such entities and activities 
may be targets of explanation in other fields. This is related to mechanistic explanations 
being in some sense continuous. Secondly, MDC also clearly think that mechanisms offer 
an intelligible explanation in a way in which regularities do not. They write:
We should not be tempted to follow Hume and later logical empiricists into thinking 
that the intelligibility of activities (or mechanisms) is reducible to their regularity. 
Descriptions of mechanisms render the end stage intelligible by showing how it is 
produced by bottom out entities and activities. To explain is not merely to redescribe 
one regularity as a series of several. (Machamer et al. 2000, 21–22)
These two claims are not surprising given the view popular within the mechanisms litera-
ture that mechanistic explanation is a much-needed alternative to laws-explanation, but a 
final claim is more striking in that context. For MDC, understanding is not an ontic matter, 
in the sense of Salmon (1998). They write:
The understanding provided by a mechanistic explanation may be correct or incor-
rect. Either way, the explanation renders a phenomenon intelligible. Mechanism 
descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. Intel-
ligibility arises not from an explanation’s correctness, but rather from an elucidative 
relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and intermediate entities and 
activities) and the explanandum (the termination condition or the phenomenon to be 
explained). (Machamer et al. 2000, 21)5
5 It is difficult to classify MDC clearly as holding an ontic or an epistemic view of mechanistic explanation. 
Craver has extensively defended the ontic conception (Craver 2014), while Darden and Machamer have 
remained largely silent, although many of their comments, particularly in the MDC paper, seem to suggest 
an ontic view. While the comments from the MDC paper that I have quoted above read as epistemic, they 
seem to concern intelligibility, rather than mechanistic explanation itself.
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They seem open to an account of understanding that is independent, then, of the influen-
tial insistence of Salmon on the need for ontic explanations, to capture causal explanation. 
Notice that the intelligibility they are concerned with seems to be of both the mechanism 
itself and thereby also of the phenomenon explained.
I lack space to examine even major figures in the mechanisms literature such as Bech-
tel (2007) and Glennan (2017) in depth, but I hope that it is at least plausible that MDC’s 
group of concerns extends more widely within that literature. For example, Bechtel, falling 
firmly on the side of epistemic explanations, is not likely to disagree. Nevertheless, after 
this fascinating beginning, major mechanists say little more about intelligibility directly.
MDC do not themselves return to the idea to give an account of how such bottom out 
activities and entities yield intelligibility. But since they cite Anscombe (1975) as the 
source of ideas concerning activities and causality, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
they believe that the Anscombian “thick causal terms” that MDC call activities—such as 
binding, bonding, and folding—are intuitively more intelligible to us than the “thin” and 
relatively uninformative concept of causality itself (Bogen 2008). So a reasonable interpre-
tation of what they mean is that the understanding of activity-terms and entity-terms gives 
scientists a grasp of what is happening, in a way in which using very abstract concepts such 
as causality—or laws—does not.
On this view, for example, we manage to explain a phenomenon such as protein synthe-
sis in terms of the chemical binding and bonding already known to the field, thus yielding a 
grasp of what MDC call the productive continuity of the whole mechanism. However, there 
are questions to ask about how and why the complete explanation yields understanding. In 
extensive work on mechanism discovery, Bechtel, Craver, and Darden have all produced 
work that has implications for this issue, but do not synthesize it to address intelligibil-
ity directly (Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010; Craver 2007; 
Darden 2002, 2006). I contribute to that broader project, but using the contextual theory of 
scientific understanding.
In Sect. 3, I will show, first, that what counts as bottom-out entities and activities for 
supernovae are varied, secondly, that what counts as productive continuity or gaps in a 
mechanistic explanation in astrophysics can be varied, but we can identify some recognis-
able ones, and, nevertheless, mechanistic explanations (alongside many other things) are 
needed to give an intelligible explanation of supernovae.
2.2  Understanding Theories
Before that, I need to examine the contextual theory of scientific understanding, which 
arose in a different literature, within a movement rejecting the idea that explanation can be 
fully characterised as a two-place relationship between an explanation and the world (see 
de Regt et al. 2009). De Regt and Dieks (2005) primarily draw cases from physics, and, 
in that context, one reason the question of understanding arose is because of the apparent 
unintelligibility of theories such as quantum mechanics, which seem to require a counterin-
tuitive and mind-boggling effort to grasp.
According to the contextual theory of scientific understanding, intelligibility is a value 
that scientists in a particular community at a particular time project onto theories that they 
can use (de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2009a, 2014, 2017). In defending this account, 
de  Regt and Dieks (2005) first dissociate scientific understanding from the feeling or 
‘sense’ of understanding rejected by many philosophers of science, notably Trout (2002), 
as being too purely subjective to be an aim of science. For example, de Regt writes: “I do 
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agree with Trout that the phenomenology of understanding has no epistemic function: the 
experience of a feeling of understanding (an ‘aha’ experience) is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for scientific understanding of a phenomenon” (de Regt 2009a, 25). I suspect that a 
substantive account of a phenomenology of understanding might go considerably beyond 
the relatively simple “sense of understanding” (Trout 2002) which de Regt and Dieks are 
rejecting, and so have some very interesting epistemic functions.6 However, I will focus on 
the positive claim of the contextual theory, with which I agree: that usability is more sub-
stantive than a purely subjective and individual feeling of understanding.7
De Regt and Dieks argue that scientists must be able to use theories to construct and 
evaluate explanations in a way that is essential to the epistemic aims of science, and can-
not be supposed to be a mere pragmatic afterthought to the ‘real explanation’. For de Regt 
and Dieks, understanding a phenomenon requires having the skills to use the theory of that 
phenomenon. Theories have virtues, and they mention as examples visualisability and sim-
plicity (de Regt and Dieks 2005, 142), but these virtues are relative to the skills that scien-
tists have to use the theories. Theories are regarded as intelligible when they have a (or the) 
cluster of virtues that allows scientists to use them. These skills cannot be acquired purely 
from textbooks, but need practice, because skills cannot—or cannot all—be translated into 
an explicit set of rules. Since these skills are essential to the construction and evaluation of 
explanations, which are essential to the epistemic aims of science, epistemic and pragmatic 
aspects of explanation are not separable in practice, in spite of being analytically distin-
guishable. So an account of the epistemic aims of science cannot ignore understanding. 
De Regt and Dieks accept the implication that theories cannot be uniquely dependent on a 
direct evidential relation to the phenomena they explain. Note that if they are right, then we 
have not really given a full account of explanation until we address the aspects of usability 
that yield understanding. This means that an account of what it is for mechanistic explana-
tions to be intelligible is a more urgent part of an account of mechanistic explanation than 
might have initially appeared.
So on this view the intelligibility of a theory is contextual because it is relative to the 
skills of a community of scientists at a time, in a way that goes beyond an individual, sub-
jective feeling of understanding. De Regt and Dieks address a possible wish for objective 
features of explanation by suggesting that we could still more-or-less-objectively test for 
understanding. They suggest one test or indicator of usability of a theory, and so of its 
intelligibility, is scientists’ ability to recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of 
the theory without performing exact calculations. They call this “CIT” (de Regt and Dieks 
2005), and their discussion makes it clear that they are trying to use CIT to capture the case 
where, in using a theory, scientists progress from being able to use a theory to make accu-
rate calculations that don’t make a lot of sense to them, to coming to have a ‘feel’ for the 
theory. According to this view, intelligibility is relative to a scientific community at a time, 
but is crucial to scientific explanation, as it is important to the fruitfulness of scientific the-
ories. De Regt writes more recently: “So intelligibility is a measure of the fruitfulness of a 
6 Which may involve aesthetics: for one argument, see Kosso (2002).
7 Note also that what Trout seems to have in mind is a mental state. Now, on a traditional understanding of 
mental states, they involve qualitative or phenomenal feel, while use might or might not involve phenom-
enal feel. However, the rise of externalist views of mental states, and particularly the flourishing literature 
on embodied, enactive and distributed cognition, has a lot in common with the view I am advocating. See 
Ylikoski (2014) and Toon (2015) for direct application of this view to understanding.
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theory, but it is a contextual measure: a theory can be fruitful for scientists in one context 
and less so for scientists in other contexts” (de Regt 2014, 381).
Since the contextual theory offers an account of understanding phenomena with intelli-
gible theories, with one test being the shift from quantitative use to qualitative understand-
ing, the application to the intelligibility of mechanistic explanations and so understanding 
the phenomena they explain is not yet clear. Nevertheless there is much of interest here. As 
a route to synthesising the two approaches, it is important that de Regt later makes it even 
clearer that he takes CIT to be one indicator among others: “There may be different ways 
to test whether a theory is intelligible for scientists, and not all of them may be applicable 
in all cases or for all disciplines” (de Regt 2009a, 32). He suggests a theory might also be 
considered intelligible if it can be used to build models, and his current work focuses on 
this.
I shall not attempt to provide tests of intelligibility, objective or not. What I will be 
focusing on is the importance of scientists’ abilities to use mechanistic explanations to the 
epistemic aims of science. However, in Sect. 3 we will see that even understanding a theory 
might require very much more than CIT, ranging over building models, mechanistic expla-
nations, and application to a case (SN1987A) to gain empirical evidence.
2.3  Understanding Phenomena with Intelligible Mechanistic Explations
I will here finish the theoretical merging of the contextual theory of scientific understand-
ing with work on mechanistic explanation to develop and defend the view that:
A phenomenon is mechanistically understood when scientists have an intelligible 
mechanistic explanation for the phenomenon; i.e. a mechanistic explanation that they 
can use.8
I argue here that these two approaches can go together, and that their combination raises 
some interesting questions. Mechanistic explanations are usually directly of a phenome-
non, where in places the contextual theory offers an account of understanding a phenom-
enon, using a theory (de Regt 2009a, 251). Laws and theories are not usually given the 
same kind of importance in mechanistic explanation, but we will see their importance in 
understanding supernovae.
Notice that for MDC, if a mechanistic explanation is intelligible, the phenomenon it 
explains is also thereby intelligible. De Regt and Dieks (2005) focus on the intelligibility 
of theories, as the way in which we understand phenomena. However, de Regt (2009b), 
having made a careful distinction, then writes: “Understanding in the sense of UP (hav-
ing an appropriate explanation of the phenomenon) is an epistemic aim of science, but 
this aim can be achieved only by means of pragmatic understanding UT (the ability to use 
the relevant theory)” (de Regt 2009b, 591–592). I agree with both MDC and de Regt that 
we can talk of understanding phenomena, and of understanding theory, particularly when 
we appreciate the full complexity of scientific practice, which will emerge in the case of 
SN1987A in Sect. 3. However, to keep things clear, I will write of understanding phenom-
ena using intelligible mechanistic explanations.
8 Note that I don’t claim mechanistic explanation is the only form of explanation in the life sciences, nor 
does my account require a specific account of mechanistic explanation, so long as it accepts the importance 
of parts and what the parts do, as I will show.
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In spite of considerable surface differences, the two approaches can be aligned. In 
accord with the contextual theory, the usability of a mechanistic explanation goes beyond 
a simple feeling of a “sense of understanding”. On this view, we can think of mechanistic 
explanations as having virtues. However, the intelligibility of a mechanistic explanation is 
not intrinsic to it, but projected onto it by the community of scientists who can use it, for 
the purposes of their practice. This use is essential for the success of their practice, their 
epistemic aims, but it is dependent on the skills of scientists.
A significant difference between laws explanation and mechanistic explanation is the 
importance of parts. Bechtel and Richardson (2010) suggested very early in the new mech-
anist literature that the mark of mechanistic explanation is the heuristic strategies of decom-
position and localisation, which concern parts. However, they now offer other heuristics, so 
I suggest we turn instead to the simpler: “Mechanistic explanation is inherently componen-
tial” (Craver 2007, 131). Note that all major mechanists recognise both what I shall call 
entities (the parts themselves) and activities (what the parts do), following Machamer et al. 
(2000) and Illari and Williamson (2012). I have explained in Sect. 2.1 that MDC take these 
to be crucial to intelligibility. But there is enormous variation in entities and activities stud-
ied in current work, and indeed parts have rarely been rigidly defined and restricted even in 
the history of mechanism, which is lengthy and rich. (Nicholson 2012, 454 also notes this.)
Thinkers such as Descartes, often considered a paradigmatically reductive mechanist, 
actually have more complex views than they are often presented as having. Descartes 
often writes about parts in his explanations, or what the mechanisms literature now calls 
entities, but the parts Descartes uses in his explanations are not all like little particles. 
Some of the most famous parts Descartes writes about are the fluid “animal spirits” of 
his account of reflexes (Roux 2017, 64). Barnaby Hutchins argues that, while the received 
view of Descartes’s mechanicism comes from his physics, such as his treatment of light, 
Descartes’s physiology is notably different. Hutchins studies Descartes’s explanation of the 
heartbeat in depth, and his explanations of muscular movement and nutrition more briefly, 
to show that his explanations of physiological phenomena look far more systemic and 
multi-level than traditionally reductive (Hutchins 2015, 65). So we should not be surprised 
to find great variation in kinds of mechanistic explanation, and in the kinds of entities and 
activities they appeal to.
It is true that grasping a mechanistic explanation, in the sense of knowing something 
about entities, activities and their organization by which the phenomenon is produced, may 
generate a feeling of understanding. But applying the contextual theory generates further 
questions. It suggests we turn our attention to examining the practices of a community of 
scientists using a mechanistic explanation, to assess whether they can use it well for the 
purposes of the kind of community-based practice suggested by de Regt and Dieks.
We should expect that it is within the context of the skills involved in that kind of prac-
tice that a community will say a mechanistic explanation has virtues, and value it as intel-
ligible. Laws and theories skate over parts, and we can see why CIT, considering math-
ematically expressed laws, prioritised the skill of manipulation of equations. Mechanistic 
explanations may share, presumably, very general virtues of explanations, such as the visu-
alisability and simplicity mentioned by de Regt and Dieks (2005). For distinctively mecha-
nistic virtues, we need to consider the role of identifying parts and what they can do, and 
forms of organization, in the uses to which mechanistic explanations are put.
Specifically for supernovae, I will show that one of the uses for which mechanistic 
explanations are recruited is building simulations of the phenomenon that help us under-
stand it, particularly in application to SN1987A. Information about mechanisms, rather 
than just laws, is crucial for building and using such simulations, because attention to 
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parts is needed. A covering law explanation in a broadly Hempelian style is not sufficient; 
instead we see a great deal of reasoning about entities such as the star core, and activities, 
particularly the ‘bounce’.
Note that both the approach of MDC to intelligibility and the contextual theory of 
understanding indicate that pragmatics will be crucial. Consider:
What is taken to be intelligible (and the different ways of making things intelligible) 
changes over time as different fields within science bottom out their descriptions of 
mechanisms in different entities and activities that are taken as, or have come to be, 
unproblematic. This suggests quite plausibly that intelligibility is historically con-
stituted and disciplinarily relative (which is nonetheless consistent with there being 
universal general characteristics of intelligibility). (Machamer et al. 2000, 22)
MDC seem here to be open to the relativity to a discipline at a time embedded in the con-
textual theory.9
This will be particularly clear in mechanistic explanations using bottom-out entities and 
activities. Consider:
Bottoming out is relative: Different types of entities and activities are where a given 
field stops when constructing mechanisms. The explanation comes to an end, and 
description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant to their interests. Also, 
scientific training is often concentrated at or around certain levels of mechanisms. 
(Machamer et al. 2000, 13)
This last idea is developed in some detail in Glennan (2017).
I will go on now to develop this account with respect to supernovae, particularly 
SN1887A, a type II supernova, in Sect. 3. I will look at bottom-out entities and activities, 
and critically examine MDC’s claims about gaps and productive continuity.
3  Understanding Supernovae
The exact nature of stars, and why some of them explode, has been a major concern for 
theoretical development, modelling and the search for observational data in astrophysics. 
Astrophysicists seek to identify the different ‘mechanisms of supernovae’. As argued else-
where, and further explained below, these explanations broadly fit the view of what mech-
anisms are that has been developed in the mechanisms literature (Illari and Williamson 
2012). In brief, mechanisms of supernovae explain the observed phenomena of ‘new stars’ 
or brighter stars, in terms of the activities of entities, such as accumulation of iron at the 
star core, their organisation, such as passing the Chandrasekhar limit, and further activities 
such as collapse and bounce. To develop my view of mechanistic understanding, I will now 
investigate how mechanistic explanations of supernovae are used, allowing us to under-
stand supernovae. This case is novel as it is unusual in both of the literatures or views that 
I discuss: the mechanisms literature doesn’t usually look to physics; while the contextual 
theory has so far focused on theory.
9 I lack space to establish it here, but this seems to me also thoroughly congruent with the work of Darden 
(2006), the work of Craver (2007) on the “mosaic unity of neuroscience”, and, especially, Bechtel’s current 
work building on Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010).
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Within this argument, use will be important in two places. First, I will show that under-
standing supernovae is a remarkably complex affair. Stellar astrophysics seeks to explain 
multiple things, (including at least the famous “H–R diagram” I will come to in a moment, 
main sequence burning, different types of supernovae, and the peculiarities of an individ-
ual supernova), and multiple things are used (including at least physical theories, stellar 
structure models, and mechanisms of supernovae). So I will show quite generally that the 
contextual theory needs to expand to consider many things that are used, that are put to 
many different uses. And while laws are indeed used to construct explanations, yielding 
understanding of phenomena, in this kind of case they are used in alliance with many other 
things, including models and mechanistic explanations.
Second, within this surrounding complex architecture, I will examine how mechanistic 
explanations are used to generate understanding of supernovae, and pull out features more 
distinctive of mechanistic explanations. We will examine the variety of bottom-out entities 
and activities for supernovae, and home in on when a mechanistic explanation is regarded 
as involving a problem or anomaly: the neutrino bounce. I will show that this isn’t a ‘gap’ 
in any simple sense, and productive continuity is also difficult to see. Nevertheless usable 
entities, activities and organisation are needed for an intelligible mechanistic explanation 
of supernovae. Further, successful use of mechanistic explanations of supernovae, i.e. 
understanding supernovae, requires the surrounding architecture of laws and models and 
the various practices which use them. We will also see that understanding supernovae is an 
immensely creative activity, in the sense developed by Bailer-Jones (1999) with respect to 
extragalactic radio sources.
Within this surrounding architecture, mechanistic explanation has a special place in 
understanding supernovae. Nevertheless, I will argue that there is no serious question of 
mechanistic explanation versus laws explanation for understanding supernovae. The two 
are deeply interdependent, not in competition. Physical law is vital (some but not all of the 
laws used are candidates for ‘fundamental’ physical law, if there is such a thing), as is its 
application to particular entities and their activities and organisation. We would have no 
understanding of stars without fundamental theory—and no fundamental theory, much less 
intelligible fundamental theory, without cases like this that require a complex architecture 
of modelling, simulation, and mechanistic explanations involving entities, activities and 
their organisation.
3.1  Stellar Structure Models
We must begin the story of supernovae with our understanding of stars. This is not depend-
ent on a particular physical theory of stars. It depends, rather, on multiple important theo-
ries in physics, including at least general relativity, quantum field theory, thermodynamics, 
and theories of light—or more generally radiative transfer. Chemistry is also important to 
stellar evolution.10 In so far as there is a ‘theory’ particular to stars, this consists in stellar 
structure models. These each consist of a cluster of equations describing the crucial ele-
ments of stars, and are used to explain their various properties, including the evolution 
of their burning. Crudely, each equation is designed to model a particular factor affecting 
stars, perhaps, in the simplest models, one governing dynamical or structural changes, one 
governing thermal changes, and one the nuclear processes (all of which characteristically 
10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to include this.
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operate on different timescales and draw on different background theories), so that when 
the equations are solved simultaneously, or simulated, the interactions between these fac-
tors can be effectively seen. Considerable simplifying assumptions are typically used, such 
as treating stars as isolated; that they have a uniform initial composition (70% hydrogen, 
25–30% helium, and trace amounts of heavier elements); and that they are spherically sym-
metric. Note that this work is needed to get theories to successfully describe a particular 
kind of entity.
A crucial and lengthy activity of that entity is main sequence burning. Understand-
ing that has been a major achievement of the use of physical theory to build stellar struc-
ture models. A striking example of explanatory success is explaining features of the 
Hertzsprung–Russell (H–R) diagram, which summarises observations of stars. If a cluster 
of observed stars are plotted on a diagram where one axis is decreasing surface tempera-
ture, and the other axis is increasing luminosity, this produces a characteristic scattering of 
the stars.11 The idea in a nutshell is that, first, stellar structure models explain why stars in 
main sequence burning are located on the central diagonal according to their initial mass, 
and that is why most of the stars we observe lie on that; secondly, stellar structure mod-
els alongside the mechanisms of supernovae explain the features of some stars that lie off 
that line, and why there are so few of them, as supernovae happen much faster than main 
sequence burning; thirdly, both of these explain that, although there are probably many 
white dwarfs, they should be very difficult to detect, so few will show on the diagram. 
Other massive stars do also show (Fig. 1). The H–R diagram is a highly processed sum-
mary of empirical evidence concerning stars, but, nevertheless, one major unifying use of 
stellar structure models is to explain this diagram, which thereby offers significant support 












Fig. 1  Schematic H–R diagram
11 This is an endlessly reproduced diagram, including various levels of detail. See Prialnik (2010, 9ff.) for 
a textbook presentation. It is also available openly in many places on the internet. For example, see https ://
en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Hertz sprun g-Russe ll_diagr am.
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This, then, is a brief summary of how stellar astrophysics uses physical theory to gener-
ate a cluster of models which helps explain what stars are, and their key activity of main 
sequence burning.
3.2  Mechanisms of Supernovae
Stellar structure models are also used to work out what will happen at the end of the life of 
a star, after main sequence burning exhausts the nuclear fuel which has been the source of 
energy supporting the star against gravitational collapse.
There are two major types of mechanism of supernovae now generally accepted: type I 
and type II (with subspecies type Ia, Ib and Ic; see also Murdin 1993). However, we will 
begin with type II, also called ‘core collapse’ or ‘iron disintegration’ supernovae. This only 
happens to high mass stars, much bigger than our sun. In brief, the iron cores of massive 
stars which have exhausted their nuclear fuel become too large to withstand gravity and 
collapse, releasing an enormous amount of gravitational potential energy, which is carried 
away, primarily by neutrinos, igniting nuclear burning in the envelope which contains the 
rest of the mass of the star.12
During their main sequence life, stars burn hydrogen, and their composition is approxi-
mately homogenous: 70% hydrogen, most of the rest helium with small amounts of heavier 
elements. The centre of the star is hotter and denser due to gravity, so hydrogen burning 
is more intense in the core. As hydrogen nears exhaustion, things change and the core 
becomes increasingly differentiated from the rest of the star. A hydrogen-exhausted helium 
core grows gradually in mass, as hydrogen burning continues in a shell around that core. 
The helium core contracts, while the envelope (the rest of the mass of the star) expands in 
response to maintain energy equilibrium. On contraction, the core heats up, which triggers 
the next round of burning, and this process repeats through helium, then carbon, oxygen 
and silicon burning, until eventually the core of the star is iron, gradually increasing in 
mass.
Iron can no longer undergo nuclear burning to release energy that can support the core 
against gravity, because making iron into a heavier element takes up energy rather than 
releasing it. Ultimately an iron core that can no longer undergo nuclear burning can only 
be supported by what is called “electron degeneracy pressure”, and modeling this is where 
quantum mechanics becomes essential. Electrons are fermions and so must obey Pauli’s 
exclusion principle, which means that only two electrons (one spin up, one spin down) can 
occupy the lowest energy state, and only two the next, and so on, so that high lying energy 
states need to be filled. Some electrons must therefore be quite high energy, and this creates 
pressure, the electron degeneracy pressure which supports the star core. However, in 1931 
Chandrasekhar calculated the upper limit to the mass of stars that can be supported by elec-
tron degeneracy pressure. It is known as the Chandrasekhar limit and is about 1.46M⨀ , 
i.e. 1.46 solar masses, although collapse can begin sooner, depending on the star’s rotation.
When the iron core passes the Chandrasekhar limit, it collapses rapidly, through vari-
ous phases. Ultimately the iron nuclei break back into protons and neutrons, and the free 
protons capture free electrons and turn into neutrons, each releasing a neutrino. As long as 
the total mass is still below the Tolman-Oppenheimer-Volkoff limit, neutron degeneracy 
12 The precise mechanism of type II supernovae remains controversial, but they are associated with neu-
trino bursts. I focus on the state of the art in 1987, surrounding work on SN1987A. See McCray (1997).
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pressure can halt the collapse, forming a neutron star which is basically one huge nucleus, 
about 20km or so in diameter. The infalling envelope of the star bounces off this incredibly 
dense matter, and the released neutrinos blast out of the core during the bounce, the whole 
carrying off a vast amount of energy, and also blasting away much of the envelope, igniting 
nuclear burning there. If the star is symmetrical, this explosion should be symmetrical, but 
we will see shortly, regarding SN1987A, that this is not always so.
With the mechanism for type II supernovae agreed, it is much easier to explain type Ia 
supernovae. Smaller stars such as our sun, which are much less massive, will not undergo 
core collapse as the entire star has less mass than the Chandrasekhar limit. Instead, such 
stars collapse to form white dwarfs after the end of nuclear burning, but these remain 
small enough to be supported against gravitational collapse by electron degeneracy pres-
sure while they still contain some usable nuclear fuel, such as carbon and oxygen, and the 
star does not collapse far enough to heat up enough to ignite their burning and so exhaust 
available nuclear fuel. Unlike our sun, many stars are not isolated, but exist in binary star 
systems, which characteristically involve the two stars exchanging mass. Type Ia superno-
vae result when a white dwarf remnant is tipped over the Chandrasekhar limit by accreting 
material from a binary companion star. Collapse begins while the star still contains nuclear 
material, significantly heating the core, and thereby triggering runaway nuclear reactions in 
the remaining nuclear material which blow the star completely apart, leaving no remnant.
These two types of supernovae are different kinds of explosions of star cores with dif-
ferent compositions, depending crucially on the Chandrasekhar mass. One major empirical 
reason to support these two separate mechanisms is that there are two distinctively differ-
ent kinds of ‘light curves’ generated when we observe and plot light and other radiation 
received on Earth from supernovae: intensity of light emitted over time and elements found 
in the spectra. Indeed, the distinction between type Ia and type II supernovae began as a 
purely phenomenal one, mostly in terms of the presence of hydrogen lines in the spectra 
of type II supernovae, but not of type I. But this distinction is now agreed to match these 
two kinds of mechanisms. This agreement is so established that type Ia supernovae are now 
used as ‘standard candles’ to calculate such things as the distances to galaxies, and ulti-
mately the speed of expansion of the universe. Since type Ia supernovae occur at approxi-
mately the same mass as each other, they should have approximately the same luminosity 
at source, so a dimmer type Ia supernova must be further away from us. Mechanisms of 
supernovae have become a vital tool in astrophysics.
Notice three things about this understanding of supernovae. First, it is generated by 
focusing on entities and activities and their organisation, most obviously the star core 
(entity), the ‘collapse’ and ‘bounce’ (activities) and the critical place of the Chandrasekhar 
limit (organisation). Second, it is deeply dependent on the understanding gained by build-
ing stellar structure models. We begin to model supernovae by realising that various 
assumptions that hold during main sequence burning will no longer hold. Most notably, 
the star does not remain approximately homogeneous, nor does the proportion of gases in 
the star continue to remain roughly constant. Instead, heavier elements begin to accrue at 
the star core. Relaxing the assumptions of homogeneity and allowing the proportion of ele-
ments to change allows for the simulation of explosions, as we will see in Sect. 3.3. Finally, 
our understanding of supernovae draws on physical theory to solve problems, to allow us to 
model entities, and calculate possible activities—in ways that can then be built into simu-
lations. This is clearly seen in the use of Pauli’s exclusion principle to explain electron 
degeneracy pressure, and help to calculate the Chandrasekhar limit. These activities are 
organised and coordinated, but this does not mean that they are not creative. Bailer-Jones 
shows that this is possible by showing how visualisations were used to put sub-models 
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back together in a coordinated but creative way to model extended extragalactic radio 
sources (Bailer-Jones 1999, 384ff.).
It is generally agreed in the current mechanisms literature that a mechanism’s activities 
and entities are not something decided in advance of investigation, but are chosen in the 
process of mechanism discovery. There is therefore no bar to a mechanistic explanation 
including such wildly divergent entities as ‘electrons’, ‘a Fermi sea’, and ‘a star’s core’; and 
such imaginative organisation and activities as ‘passing the Chandrasekhar limit’ and ‘col-
lapsing’. It is a slightly different thing how entities and activities are chosen that require no 
further explanation. Recall from Sect. 2 that MDC call such entities and activities “bottom-
out”, which means they are regarded as unproblematic by a particular field at a particular 
time. So long as the explanations of supernovae bottom out in entities and activities that 
are regarded by astrophysicists as unproblematic, then the mechanistic explanation will 
also be regarded by astrophysicists as intelligible.
In the discussion above we can see this in how electron degeneracy pressure is impor-
tant in answering the mystery of how a neutron star is supported against gravity when it 
cannot be by nuclear burning. Pauli’s exclusion principle is regarded as unproblematic to 
astrophysics, although that is not true in other areas of physics. There are still complica-
tions, however, because what is regarded as unproblematic changes over time. We will see 
in Sect. 3.3 when something is problematic, how that changes, and how that is related to 
‘gaps’ in mechanistic explanations.
Recall that I said at the beginning of Sect. 3 that use would prove to be important to 
understanding supernovae in two main ways. These should now have begun to become 
clearer as the full complexity of our understanding of supernovae is emerging. The abil-
ity of scientists to generate mechanisms of supernovae is dependent on physical theory, 
and stellar structure models, which are used to generate mechanistic explanations of dif-
ferent types of supernovae consistent with two distinct empirically observed phenomena. 
The mechanistic explanations of both major types of supernovae remain embedded in this 
context, allowing among other things the use of type Ia supernovae as standard candles. 
This shows that mechanistic explanations of supernovae depend at least on our ability to 
use fundamental physical theory and to build and use stellar structure models—modifying 
their assumptions for the end of a star’s life. Laws explanation and mechanistic explanation 
are not in competition, but interdependent and embedded also in other scientific practices. 
What we know about the entities and activities of stars is used to adapt models, make simu-
lations, and work out which laws to apply and how.
This means that the first place in which use is important is in the myriad of uses of 
myriad scientific creations to understand supernovae. The contextual theory of scientific 
explanation needs to expand, even in its account of how laws are used to understand phe-
nomena, to allow that laws are used alongside many other things like models and mecha-
nistic explanations in this case and cases like it. Happily it seems the contextual theory has 
the resources to do this. I began that setup in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3, but here we can see that 
the main claims of the contextual theory seem to be right: that use is important, and that 
these uses are essential to the epistemic aims of science, rather than a mere afterthought.
The second place in which use is important shows when we home in on how the mecha-
nistic explanations are used in understanding supernovae. This case is not really a case 
where there are different explanations of supernovae, and the mechanistic explanation is 
distinct in kind from the others. Instead, it is not clear this understanding could be achieved 
any other way; mechanistic explanation is a part, but an important part, of the wider archi-
tecture of laws and stellar structure models used to understand stars. General physical the-
ory is important, but cannot be used alone. The process of getting it to apply to the special 
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entity ‘star’, is itself an immensely creative empirically informed endeavour. We have to 
turn to trying to model the parts, in accord with such empirical data as we can gather. 
Mechanistic explanation is essential to the process. We will see shortly an instance of such 
a mechanistic explanation achieving success in deepening our understanding of type II 
supernovae.
Within this architecture of laws, models, and mechanisms, I suggest that these combina-
tions of uses constitute understanding of various phenomena, rather than just identifying 
when understanding occurs, or offering a test for it. Unlike a purely subjective feeling of 
understanding of the kind criticised by Trout, these uses can explain why we value under-
standing, because they exist when an explanation is fruitful, as de Regt says. These uses 
may be accompanied by phenomenology, but any such phenomenology is not the whole 
story. Further, it is becoming increasingly clear how deeply intertwined explanation and 
understanding are. In the kinds of cases that de Regt and Dieks originally consider, it is 
possible for scientists to know a theory, and only later come to develop the skills to use 
it, and so have understanding. But having an explanation and using it are far harder to 
separate in a practice such as stellar astrophysics. Analytically we can separate knowing 
a mechanistic explanation and being able to use it, but in the practice itself these are very 
difficult to separate. Using the explanation is often part of how we get it, and it is always 
involved in developing and improving an existing explanation.
The next section will examine how we take a general model of a stable entity and build 
a simulation of a particular explosion, thereby also gaining empirical evidence for both a 
crucial piece of the mechanism of type II supernova, and for particle physics.
3.3  Supernova SN1987A
For various reasons, we have still more work to do to understand an individual supernova, 
and I will show that this work is both a vital use of the mechanism of type II supernovae, 
and crucial to letting empirical evidence impact on the surrounding architecture of laws 
and stellar structure models that I have described.
SN1987A is one of the most important type II supernovae ever observed. It was the core 
collapse of a massive star (Sanduleak-69 202, approximately 18M⨀ ) in the Large Magel-
lanic Cloud. It was spotted in 1987, and, while not in our galaxy, the Large Magellanic 
Cloud is an unobscured close companion galaxy, making SN1987A at its time one of the 
closest supernovae in several hundred years. It was also the first supernova to be observed 
with many of our modern capabilities, including neutrino detectors at Kamiokande and 
IMB, and later space telescopes like Hubble and Chandra. It was also the first supernova 
where the progenitor star was already known.13 It also had some fascinating peculiarities 
that manifested in a non-standard light-curve, and a distinctive asymmetric squashed-fig-
ure-8 shape, and these are still being investigated.
SN1987A is particularly illuminating for our purposes because its most immediate 
impact was to generate for a time considerable agreement about the mechanism of type 
II supernovae. The neutrino blast which had been posited as the major means of carrying 
away the energy of collapse was very controversial, constituting what MDC would prob-
ably recognise as a ‘gap’ in the mechanism, or a failure of ‘productive continuity’, and 
therefore intelligibility. For the first time scientists were able to detect two bursts of neutri-
nos from SN1987A, one each by Kamiokande and IMB (a third burst was reported at the 
13 In 2010 it remained the only such supernova (Prialnik 2010).
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time but later withdrawn). This generated significant consensus in the astrophysics com-
munity about the role of a neutrino burst. Further, particle physics met astrophysics as the 
first detection of neutrinos from such a source energised a great deal of work on both those 
bursts and more theoretical understanding of neutrinos in general (Walker 1987).
SN1987A also involved other mysteries that are fascinating for our purposes. That the 
supernova would be of type II was not a surprise: as Sanduleak-69 202 is estimated to have 
begun its life at approximately 20M⨀ , its core was very likely to pass the Chandrasekhar 
limit at some point, in spite of an estimated 2M⨀ lost due to stellar winds. However there 
was significant debate, particularly from 1987 to 1989, about which was the progenitor star 
(Fabian et al. 1987; Joss et al. 1988; Podsiadlowski and Joss 1989; Chevalier 1992). Sandu-
leak-69 202 was a blue supergiant, and the community was surprised that it would be ready 
to explode. Not until the brightness of the supernova dimmed enough for it to be seen that 
Sanduleak-69 202 had gone was there agreement that it was indeed the progenitor. It is 
thought that SN1987A being the explosion of a blue supergiant was the main reason for the 
second mystery, its non-standard light-curve (Chevalier 1992).
The final feature of SN1987A I will discuss is its distinctive squashed-figure-8 appear-
ance, composed of a bright central ring and two larger, dimmer, rings.14 To us on Earth, it 
appeared as a bright centre, surrounded by an even brighter central ring (Fig. 2). This is 
common with a supernova, with the centre being thought to be the supernova remnant lit 
by radioactive decay, and the ring indicating nuclear burning in the envelope ignited by the 
blast. But this ring of SN1987A showed significant asymmetries, which have been under-
stood using simulations from early years (Papaliolios et al. 1989). But SN1987A also had 
two much larger, fainter rings overlapping, to look from Earth like a squashed up figure 8. 
These are more mysterious, and were thought to indicate the ends of two cones expanding 
violently in opposite directions from the central explosion, showing that there was asym-
metry in the explosion. This has been understood in many ways, most by running super-
nova simulations including significant asymmetric effects (Sato et al. 1996). More recently, 
Fig. 2  Schematic shape of SN1987A
14 Images are widely available. See, for example, Hubble’s image http://www.space teles cope.org/image s/
potw1 142a/, or https ://en.wikip edia.org/wiki/SN_1987A .
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they have been suggested to be the result of outflow from the progenitor while still in its 
red supergiant phase (de Grijs 2015).
In these three examples, the mechanism of type II supernovae was used, but adapted 
to account for the peculiarities of SN1987A. These uses constitute understanding of the 
more general mechanism, while in turn further uses in the astrophysics of supernovae show 
understanding of the particular event SN1987A. So here the mechanism of type II super-
novae as so far known was the primary thing used. It is clear that a general understanding 
of a kind of supernova, which was all we had before spotting SN1987A, was applied to 
understand a particular phenomenon—a case of type II supernovae that was distinctive in 
various ways. But the general mechanism of type II supernovae was not used in a vacuum. 
First, it was supplemented by filling in a gap. Second, against the background of laws and 
stellar structure models, it was used alongside other things, specifically simulations, to 
understand why SN1987A appears to us as it does.
This required modelling what was peculiar about the particular entities and activities of 
SN1987A. So simulations were used to explore what kinds of asymmetries in a star might 
lead to the kind of asymmetric explosion we seemed to see, or whether outflow was more 
likely. Speculation about what kind of star might have led to such an explosion, with the 
right kind of light curve, was also important until it was clear that Sanduleak-69 202 had 
gone. These uses were important to help us use the crucial empirical evidence that we got 
from SN1987A.
This was particularly important to allow the consensus about the mechanism of type II 
supernovae. They had been regarded as a problem because there was no general agreement 
prior to 1987 about a crucial activity. We could calculate the enormous amount of energy 
which would be released on core collapse, but there was no consensus about where it went. 
Missing energy seems to be a clear failure of productive continuity. It is also an important 
gap in a mechanism, when a crucial activity is unknown, even mysterious. Neutrinos are 
extremely difficult to detect, and prior to 1987 a neutrino burst was one posited means of 
carrying away the energy. But once two different neutrino detectors reported a neutrino 
burst from a visible supernova, the community rapidly converged on a neutrino burst dur-
ing the bounce as the missing activity that was needed. The gap that had been regarded as 
problematic was no more.
It should become clear here that mechanistic explanation, and understanding phenom-
ena using a mechanistic explanation, are deeply intertwined. Recall that MDC say that 
mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. 
They also say that intelligibility doesn’t require a how-actually explanation, but merely an 
elucidative relationship (Machamer et al. 2000, 21). Before 1987, type II supernovae had 
some possible explanations. However, in achieving consensus, a gap in the explanation was 
filled in, and intelligibility of the mechanism was increased. So, as I noted in Sect. 2.3, in 
cases like this we don’t get the explanation, and afterwards work on using it and under-
standing the phenomenon. Use of the explanation is already ongoing in the practice. So 
here, we improve our explanation, and improve intelligibility and understanding, together.
This is important, but one of the lessons of SN1987A is that it is very particular. What 
a community regards as unproblematic is very dependent on the state of that community at 
that time—and very particularly on what else they know and what tools they have. I am not 
giving an account of explanation, but of understanding, and I take the community being 
able to use the explanation to be constitutive of understanding. I shall continue to develop 
this last idea in the rest of this section.
The community clearly regarded gaps, or breaks in productive continuity of this kind, 
to be a problem, and indeed to impede use. After 1987 they had a preferred mechanism 
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of type II supernovae that they could use. But note that I chose this as a clear case. Much 
of the other work that was done on SN1987A was very exploratory, and could have led to 
very different results. At the time, for example, the non-standard light-curve might have 
proven to be of a hitherto unseen type of supernovae. Therefore, much of the empirical 
data could have turned out to indicate different gaps or problems of productive continuity.
The lesson for what the virtues of mechanistic explanations are is also one of particular-
ity. Recall that according to the contextual theory I have been developing for mechanis-
tic explanations, virtues are projected by scientists onto mechanistic explanations they can 
use. We can see here some general virtues that have been advanced of scientific work in 
general, including coherence with other things we know, and fit with empirical data.
However, these virtues show here their very particular facets. Here, coherence with 
what else we know cannot easily be formalised.15 It involves the creative embedding in the 
whole architecture I have described above, where first physical law is used to make stellar 
structure models, and then these are adapted to generate mechanisms of supernovae. Fit 
with empirical data is extremely particular, and in some cases such as SN1987A this needs 
customised modelling and simulation. Far from being merely ad hoc and overfitted, models 
of individual cases are essential. Distinctively mechanistic virtues appear in the homing 
in on modelling a particular entity, and a particular instance of an activity. And this is the 
only way to get evidence that bears on the more general mechanism, as we discover more 
about what can happen with those kinds of entities and activities.
This whole process of modelling SN1987A and fitting it into what else we know about 
stellar structure models and type II supernovae is creative as above, active in the sense 
of being an ongoing process, and is highly skilled. I take this to be constitutive of under-
standing, rejecting the view of understanding as a phenomenological feeling, where that is 
construed as something more passively received. Note what “coherence” and “fit” mean 
here: a very active and creative process was required to model SN1987A and fit it into 
the surrounding architecture of what we already knew, and also with the empirical data 
we were constantly getting from our observations. The multiple tasks involved are highly 
skilled and shared across a large community, highly active, not a passive, wholly subjec-
tive feeling. The more distinctively mechanistic virtues include the role of identifying parts 
and what they can do, and the identification of forms of organisation and their place in the 
explanation of the phenomenon.
It would be extremely difficult to extract simple tests of scientists’ understanding of 
these various scientific items. No one particular skill or ability to use mechanistic explana-
tions of supernovae is likely to indicate understanding of supernovae in any particularly 
reliable way. Instead, it seems that the shared abilities of the community to use the mecha-
nistic explanations of supernovae in many different ways, embedded in the ability to use 
other things such as stellar structure models, constitutes the scientific community under-
standing supernovae. Many different abilities may indicate understanding on the part of 
individual scientists—but that will be a matter for the community to judge. It seems to me 
to make no particular sense to try to specify a bar for the understanding of an individual 
15 Ruphy (2011) offers us an important warning that models created from this kind of simulation process 
may exhibit what she calls permanent incompatible pluralism. She writes: “And the point is that those alter-
native pictures would be equally plausible in the sense that they would also be consistent both with the 
observations at hand and with our current theoretical knowledge” (Ruphy 2011, 184). Even worse, in some 
cases this kind of incompatibility will not be temporary, but permanent, in the sense that we cannot expect 
the incompatible plurality to go away when new data come in.
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scientist. Instead, understanding is a multifaceted thing, had by a community, and any 
understanding individual scientists have of type II supernovae, and SN1987A in particular, 
is dependent upon the skills of the community.
4  Conclusion
I have developed and defended the views of de Regt and Dieks, to show that understanding 
type II supernovae required the use of many different kinds of things, involving both theo-
retical and embodied skills, and that the resulting understanding is primarily the achieve-
ment of a community. This use, and so the understanding that I have claimed it constitutes, 
is an active and ongoing thing, an activity of a community, rather than a passive achieve-
ment of individuals. It offers an account of intelligibility of mechanisms which is a use-
ful contribution to the mechanisms literature, as is the application to the unusual case of 
SN1987A.
I will finish with some reflections on the contextual theory I have applied. In de Regt 
and Dieks’ initial work, CIT as a test, or the ability of scientists to recognise qualita-
tively characteristic consequences of the theory without performing exact calculations, 
was important. No doubt many scientists became comfortable with quantitative models of 
SN187A, but even this part of their work did not involve using a single theory, but build-
ing many models and simulations. Even in far more recent work, de Regt still focuses on 
prediction of consequences, although he construes it as a skill: “I will develop the idea that 
understanding phenomena consists in the ability to use a theory to generate predictions of 
the target systems behavior” (de Regt 2015, 3781). It is the ability, not a correct outcome, 
which is de Regt’s focus, and I have shown that this is an important difference.
Further, I have shown that even in the project of using theory to understand a phe-
nomenon, the uses and skills required go far beyond that envisaged by de Regt and Dieks 
(2005). To understand supernovae, astrophysicists drew on physical theory, clusters of stel-
lar structure models constituted by groups of equations, and built theoretically possible 
mechanisms of explosion, and increasingly specialised models and simulations ultimately 
designed for explaining features of individual stars. In explaining SN1987A simulations 
were used to explain features like its asymmetry: in a way that involves reproducing the 
behaviour, of course, but simulations are much richer than prediction. In stellar astrophys-
ics generally, new phenomena are even created. In the H–R diagram, we have the construc-
tion of a complex new phenomenon that is explained successfully with stellar structure 
models.16 So the turn towards models since de Regt (2015) is welcome.
I accepted de Regt and Dieks’ claim that scientific understanding goes significantly 
beyond a purely subjective and possibly individual ‘sense’ of understanding of the kind 
criticised by Trout (2002). Although I hold that such a sense still could have some impor-
tant epistemic roles, and noted that according to current embodied or enactive views of 
mental states, any sharp dichotomy between thinking of understanding as a mental state 
and thinking of it as involving skills is rather artificial. Nevertheless, I have offered even 
more reason for rejecting the purely subjective sense of understanding that Trout criti-
cises as the whole story of understanding. While scientists might also experience phenom-
enological responses to this achievement, and these activities, feeling that in using them 
16 See Boon (2009) for discussion of this in another context.
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extensively they have developed a more intuitive grasp of them, there is a great deal more 
going on here if we pay attention to use.
I am willing to accept the consequence, which some might find counterintuitive, that a 
scientist could in principle count as understanding a theory even in the absence of her—
or even the whole community—‘feeling’ that they understand it. On this view we might 
just be disappointed in what we subjectively wanted when we embarked on a project. This 
seems to agree with a remark by Hasok Chang:
With these insights, I can finally tackle something that has been an enduring puzzle 
to me: what is the difference between simply applying an algorithm to solve a prob-
lem, and doing the same with a sense of understanding? Simply following an algo-
rithm provides no relevant understanding to someone who is interested in some other 
epistemic activity, for example, visualizing what is going on, or giving a mechanical 
explanation. But for someone whose goal is to derive a prediction, there is surely the 
relevant sense of understanding in knowing how to apply the right tricks to derive the 
answer. (When I was an undergraduate, learning physics in the standard way gave me 
no sense of understanding because I went into the enterprise expecting something 
else. It was my mistake to think that my classmates who were not dissatisfied like me 
were in some way shallow or unreflective; they were simply happy with the epistemic 
activity they were engaged in.) (Chang 2009, 76)
I am also happy with the various controversial implications of the view that I have been 
noting throughout. Understanding or intelligibility is a value that the scientific community 
at a particular time confers on theories, models and mechanisms that they can use. Under-
standing is therefore something had by a community, and only derivatively by individuals. 
Finally, the complexity of the multiple uses and skills involved in understanding, and the 
purposes of theories, mechanisms and models, means that understanding will rarely if ever 
be an all-or-nothing matter. Understanding comes in greater and lesser degrees, and since 
it involves multiple skills, it may lie on a multidimensional continuum. That there are no 
sharp distinctions here still does not imply that it is an arbitrary matter.
I wish to finish by raising a concern for the new view. This account sets the bar for 
understanding very high, in the sense that only members of the relevant scientific com-
munity will really have access to the training to acquire the theoretical skills really needed 
to use scientific theories, models, and mechanisms. While the importance of these kinds 
of skills is crucial, this account would seem to bar anyone other than active experts from 
understanding the scientific phenomena we think we have explained. How others under-
stand is not a simple issue, and I reserve it for further work: roughly, though, I expect that 
the very different kinds of uses people outwith the relevant community have for scientific 
knowledge might well be key to that story.
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